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23 JAN 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CHAMBERLIN:

Subject: National Intelligence Requirements - China

1. Reference your memorandum of 6 January 1947, subject, CIG 19, which reads:

"1. Approval of CIG 19 was originally given subject to the approval of the collection plan drawn up for its implementation.

2. CIG 19 and its accompanying plan for collection were accepted as an experiment in the coordination of the collection of intelligence--[ ] being selected as the field for the experiment. This action was taken with the hope that it might lead to a solution of the fundamental problems of the coordination of all collection activities and the delineation of intelligence responsibilities, although it was recognized that it and its counterpart, the CIG plan, was more limited in scope than, and somewhat contrary to, War Department doctrines which are global in nature.

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3. Since CIG 19 was initiated, NIA Directive No. 7 has been published, coordinating the entire field of collection activities. CIG 23, too, (which coordinates the responsibilities for the production of intelligence) is now in circulation and apparently its approval is in sight. When approved, CIG 23, together with NIA Directive No. 7, would appear to obviate the desirability [ ] experiment.

4. In view of the publication of NIA Directive No. 7 and the impending publication of the Enclosure to CIG 23, it is recommended that CIG 19 and its accompanying collection plan be withdrawn from the consideration of the Intelligence Advisory Board or at least postponed for consideration to insure that it be brought into full consonance with the broader directives."

2. Your proposal that CIG discontinue the preparation of National Intelligence Requirements indicates a misunderstanding of the national intelligence program as it is being developed by CIG with the advice and assistance of representatives of the IAB agencies. I, therefore, believe it advisable to explain this program in some detail so that

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you may see the part to be played by the National Intelligence Requirements, their absolute necessity to the Director of Central Intelligence in the performance of his mission, and their expected usefulness to the several agencies.

3. In its efforts to comply with the mission assigned to it by the President's letter of 22 January 1946 as interpreted in part by subsequent NIA Directives, the CIO, under my direction, has undertaken to develop plans "to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security," and "to furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War, and Navy Departments, etc." These plans have fallen under the three general heads of: (a) collection; (b) research or production; (c) dissemination. These several specific problems which have been referred by the agencies to CIO for coordination have also been studied in the light of these three basic categories.

4. These three basic plans are designed to facilitate the implementation of the collection, research, and dissemination of: (a) departmental intelligence; and (b) strategic or national policy intelligence. By the President's letter, departmental intelligence continues to be the responsibility of the departments. It has such subdivisions as tactical intelligence, combat intelligence, operational intelligence, and staff intelligence. Strategic and national policy intelligence is allocated by the President to the Director of Central Intelligence. It is composed of such parts as daily digests of current intelligence, situation reports, special evaluations, and basic intelligence. Overall it is that intelligence which results from an expert correlation, evaluation, and analysis of all available intelligence information, including departmental intelligence, for the use of the President and top policy officers of the Government in developing policies for the protection of the national security. CIO's interests in this national strategic intelligence is paramount since the Director of Central Intelligence alone is authorized to produce it. He must, therefore, determine its collection requirements and procedures, research requirements and procedures, and dissemination requirements and procedures. To this end "all necessary facilities, intelligence and information in the possession of the respective departments" is by NIA Directive No. 1 made available to the DCI.

5. In developing its plans for the coordination of the three basic phases of intelligence work, CIO has attempted and sincerely believes that it has given careful consideration to the requirements of the several agencies as well as to its own requirements. Every effort has been made to create an appreciation by the agencies of their interdependability and the logic of closer cooperation.

6. One of the forces behind the original creation of the central intelligence organization was the lack of some central point where the intelligence of the four agencies could be correlated objectively, free from departmental pressures, and evaluated as a whole.

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7. A collection plan can provide for the coordination of all collection activities and procedures whether they are for the collection of material for departmental or national strategic intelligence. But to be a continuing plan not requiring frequent change it cannot contain directives as to what intelligence material is most desired during any given period. The requirements of today are not the requirements of tomorrow. At most it can allocate broad fields to specialized collectors. Even here provision must be made for ad hoc reallocation on special occasions. The mass of intelligence material available to efficient collectors is such that selection must be made. That selection can be made only by those having the perspective of distance and a knowledge of the policy or operational officers' demand for estimates. No basic plan for collection coordination meets this requirement. Only some specific program such as the NIR providing periodic guidance, which can be implemented by the collection coordination plan, will do this. By consultation with the agencies the NIR will insofar as possible include in order of their relative importance the intelligence requirements of the several agencies and of CIO. The National Intelligence Requirements will also serve as guidance for the general activities of Special Operations. Their absence will leave the coordinators designated by NIA Directive No. 7 without the guidance they must have for the implementation of that plan. Because of the above and because of my responsibility to produce national strategic intelligence, I believe in the necessity of the prompt issuance of the National Intelligence Requirements for the strategic areas of the world and must take such steps as appear appropriate to that end. It is my understanding that other intelligence agencies represented in IAH concur in this opinion.

6. The production plan is a natural companion of the collection plan. Without that coordination which establishes sound and sure agency interdependability, each agency must operate as a self-contained unit performing by and for itself all the collection and production procedures. Allocation in one field requires concurrent allocation in the other. It cannot be expected that the intelligence requirements of the several agencies for their own departmental intelligence will produce the intelligence necessary for the production of national strategic intelligence. Conversely, there is no intention that the NIR will restrict the reporting by agency representatives abroad in fulfillment of their parent agency's requests for intelligence of current value to departmental intelligence. Nor will the NIR replace the standing instructions providing for the steady flow of factual data destined for the compilation or revision of basic or static intelligence. The NIR are intended only to give guidance as to what emphasis should be placed within the vast field. They have to serve as a current periodic program for the implementation of the basic long-range plan. This does not preclude the procedure whereby basic estimates will be further treated by any or all of the agencies in the preparation of their departmental intelligence. But the mere possession of intelligence in no matter what form is not an end in itself. There must, therefore, be a dissemination procedure.

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9. The dissemination plan must insure the rapid dissemination of all incoming intelligence information to those agencies that may require it in that form. It should equally discontinue the dissemination of intelligence material which is not wanted and which only confuses by its oppressive volume. In addition, it should insure the dissemination of basic estimates required for the development of departmental intelligence. And finally, it should insure the receipt by CIG of all departmental intelligence studies and estimates so that proper strategic and national policy intelligence may be prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence for the President.

10. I, therefore, request that you issue such directives as may be necessary to the individuals already designated by you to assist the CIG in preparing NIR for the USSR and the Middle East. Invitations for interagency meetings to prepare these NIR will be issued in the next few days.

11. I also request that you give your concurrence to the immediate issuance of NIR China. As you are aware, the preparation of NIR China was initiated on 30 August 1946 with the idea they would be revised quarterly. The NIR China was approved by the IAB on 7 November 1946 and the subsequent delay has been the result of consideration of the implementing directive. Although I believe the detailed implementing directives for the NIR will, when the plan is eventually perfected, insure the most efficient intelligence production, I am withdrawing the implementing directive to NIR China and shall refer the problem of their implementation to CIG Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination who will issue such collection requests as may appear necessary.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director of Central Intelligence

DE/mhb  
I-20 Jan 1947

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